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From "Cooperator's Loss" to Cooperative Gain:
Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement
Adam L. Aronson
INTRODUCTION
Greenhouse gas abatement has proved to be among the most difficult
environmental issues on which to negotiate global agreement.1 The
Convention on Climate Change, presented for signature at the United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June
of 1992, took fifteen months to prepare.2 The final document was so watered
down, primarily at the insistence of the U.S., that it provided neither specific
timetables nor targets for limiting emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG's) by
industrialized countries.3 The Climate Convention hence provides only a
framework for the limitation of GHG's, and specific agreements for limiting
reductions have yet to be negotiated.4
This Note proposes that the international community has failed to negotiate
a specific agreement limiting GHG emissions because some nations have more
I. Rio Conference on Environment and Development, 22 ENVTL. POL'Y & L., 204, 211 (1992)
[hereinafter Rio Conference]; see Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming summer 1993); Jessica T. Mathews,
Introduction and Overview, in GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME I (world
Resources Institute, 1991).
2. Bodansky, supra note 1; Rio Conference, supra note 1, at 207.
3. Rio Conference, supra note 1, at 207.
4. Bodansky, supra note 1; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE LJ. 2039, 2103 (1993).
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to lose than to gain from an international abatement regime, though the benefit
to the world from their participation in such a regime may exceed the costs.
Arguing from this premise, the Note advocates an efficiency-maximizing
international tradeable emissions permit (ITEP) system that would distribute
the costs and benefits of GHG abatement in order to motivate every nation to
participate in an abatement agreement.
Part I surveys the scientific and economic analyses of global warming's
impact on the international community in order to establish that GHG
abatement action is warranted. Economists and lawmakers disagree among
themselves because of uncertain scientific data and differing assumptions built
into the economic models. However, GHG emissions require an international
policy response both because global warming could cause irreversible and
catastrophic harm to humans and other species and because an international
agreement could lower total abatement costs by increasing the marginal
efficiency of abatement investment.
Part II uses game theory to argue that GHG emissions reduction presents
a unique problem for international negotiation. Certain nations, including the
U.S. and less developed countries (LDC's), may suffer a loss from cooperating
in a GHG abatement regime, although the benefits to the world of their
cooperation may exceed their costs. This problem is neither a Prisoner's
Dilemma (in which the benefits of total cooperation outweigh the benefits of
total noncooperation for each player) nor a Deadlock (in which the benefits of
total noncooperation outweigh the benefits of total cooperation for each
player), but what this Note dubs a "Cooperator's Loss" (in which the total
benefits of cooperation outweigh the total benefits of noncooperation, but for
one of the two players, total noncooperation nevertheless remains a more
attractive alternative than total cooperation).
Part Ill proposes that an international tradeable emissions permit (ITEP)
system could allow transfers that would resolve the Cooperator's Loss,
benefiting both developing and developed nations and maximizing the
efficiency of international GHG emissions reduction. Industries in developed
nations such as the U.S. could then purchase or lease permits at competitive
international market rates or receive permits in exchange for relatively low-cost
technology transfer. Developing nations would benefit from an infusion of
technology and revenue from the sale, lease, or exchange of such permits.
Finally, an analysis of the steepness of the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves in the GHG abatement context demonstrates that an ITEP system would
be more efficient than a tax system in reducing GHG emissions.
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I. SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF
INCREASING GHG CONCENTRATIONS
A. Sources of Uncertainty
Before considering how disparate regional and national perspectives
present barriers to negotiating an agreement on GHG abatement,5 this Part
proposes that even from a global perspective, fundamental disagreement about
appropriate policy action derives first from scientific uncertainty and second
from conflicting assumptions that economists build into models that attempt
to predict global warming's economic impact.
On the scientific side, estimates of the warming that will take place after
a doubling of CO2 equivalent6 vary from 1.5 to 5.5°C (2.7 to 9.9"F).
Researchers are also unsure about how other weather patterns, such as
precipitation, may change with global warming and about the impact of such
climate changes on humans and other forms of life.8 Scientific uncertainty
accounts for much of the disagreement over appropriate policy responses to
global warming. For example, based on the prediction that increases in
temperature will be lowest near the already warm equator, and greatest at the
cold poles, Wilfred Beckerman argues that the world as a whole might be
better off with global warming.9 At the other extreme, Senator George
Mitchell focuses on predictions that global warming will gravely disrupt the
world's climate patterns, causing an "ecological holocaust" in which thermal
swelling of the seas floods entire cities, shifting climate zones displace millions
of people, "raging hurricanes" kill millions of others, and droughts "drive
[entire continents] ... into mass starvation."'"
Compounding the uncertainty inherent in the scientific data, economists
rely on diverse economic assumptions in building their predictive global
5. See infra Part II.
6. The CO2 equivalent of a GHG is the amount of carbon dioxide that would lead to the same level
of climate warming as given amounts of other GHG's. William D. Nordhaus, The Cost of Slowing Climate
Change: A Survey, 12 ENERGY J. 37, 38 (1991).
7. JOHN FIROR, THE CHANGING ATMOSPHERE 57 (1990); see COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING
AND PUBLIC POLICY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE VARMING 18 (1991) [hereinafter POLICY
IMPLICATIONS] (suggesting that the possible range is 1.9 to 5.2"C (3.4 to 9.4"F)); OFFICE OF POLICY,
PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY OPTIONS FOR
STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE, DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (1989) (noting that
a warming of 5.5*C as a result of doubling of CO2 concentrations may be at least as likely as a warming
of 1.5"C).
8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at 2; see WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL
WARMING 30-31 (1992) (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FIRST
ASSESSMENT REPORT, VOLUME I: OVERVIEW AND SUMMARIES 5-9 (Aug. 1990) (listing potential secondary
climate effects, such as droughts, storms and flooding, but suggesting extent and cost of such effects are
uncertain)).
9. Wilfred Beckerman, Global Warming: A Sceptical Economic Assessment, in ECONOMIC POLICY
TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT 52, 57 (Dieter Helm ed., 1991).
10. SENATOR GEORGE J. MITCHELL, WORLD ON FIRE 21, 70 (1991).
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warming models. Economists William Nordhaus and William Cline, the only
two economists to study both the potential costs and the potential benefits of
a GHG abatement regime," have reached dramatically different conclusions
about the efficient level of GHG abatement action because of their differing
assumptions regarding the appropriate discount rate to apply to future harms
from global warming,'2 the impact of risk aversion on cost-benefit
calculations, 3 and differing perspectives on harms that may not accrue until
the distant future.' 4 While Nordhaus advocates an 11% reduction in GHG
emissions from baseline, 5 Cline advocates a 25% reduction from baseline by
2000,16 71% reduction by 2050, 82% reduction by 2100, and 90% reduction
by 2200.1
7
B. Accounting for Uncertainty in Designing Policy
Given the level of uncertainty involved in predicting the impact of global
warming, some policymakers would delay significant measures until scientific
knowledge is refined, while others have urged that the potential irreversible
effects of global warming warrant immediate, aggressive action. This Section
11. See Beckerman, supra note 9, at 62; Richard D. Morgenstem, Towards a Comprehensive Approach
to Global Climate Change Mitigation, AM. ECON. REV., May 1991, at 140, 140 (identifying Nordhaus as
the only economist to write about both damage and cost functions associated with climate change). Since
Morgenstern wrote his article, William Cline has become the second economist to write about both benefit
and costs functions. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 8. Because Nordhaus and Cline are the only two
economists to have written about both cost and benefit functions to date, this Note will focus on their
contrasting economic analyses.
12. Cline argues that the discount rate applied to calculations of future benefits received from current
expenditures should be 2%, in contrast to the 4% discount rate used by Nordhaus. CLINE, supra note 8, at
268, 311; William D. Nordhaus, To Slow or Not To Slow: The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect, 101
ECON. J. 920, 926 (1991). Nordhaus uses the 4% discount figure because "[iln advanced countries today,
the real rate of return on capital is estimated to be between 4 and 10% per year." Id. He also provides
estimates of benefits using a lower discount rate (3%) and a higher discount rate (7%), but refers to the 4%
figure as his "middle discount rate," id. at 934, and it is the calculations from the 4% rate that he cites in
his final conclusions. See id. at 927 tbl. 3, 936. Cline attaches great weight to the "social rate of time
preference" (the discount rate for consumption), which tends to be lower than the rate of return on
investment, CLINE, supra note 8, at 236, in calculating his discount rate. Id. at 237-38, 267-68. This method
of calculating the discount rate was developed by four economists in the 1960's and 1970's and has been
used increasingly by other economists in recent years. Id. at 243-44.
13. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 300 (stating that because of risk aversion, the weight applied to the
most severe global warming scenario should be three times the weight applied to the least severe global
warming scenario); id. at 309 (concluding that, with risk aversion, there should be much more extensive
abatement action than the Nordhaus analysis suggests).
14. Id. at 4, 307. "The estimates here consider much greater warming for the very long term and
associated nonlinear damage, whereas the Nordhaus analysis focuses on carbon-dioxide-equivalent
doubling." Id. at 311.
15. Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 933-34. Note that an 11% reduction from the baseline level of
emissions would still mean that emissions would increase in the future, but that they would be 1 I% lower
than if no GHG abatement policy were implemented. Id. at 933. According to Nordhaus' calculations, an
11% reduction from baseline can be made at very low cost-$2.9 billion per year, with a net benefit of
$3.6 billion. Id. at 934 & tbl. 7.
16. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 290 tbl 7.2, 369 (advocating 20% reduction from 1990 levels by the
year 2000, which is the same as 25% reduction from year 2000 baseline levels).
17. Id. at 309.
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argues that a market-based international tradeable emissions permit system
would not only reduce the potential for catastrophic and irreversible damage
from global warming, but would also reduce the total costs, and thereby
increase the net benefits, of GHG abatement. The potential for lower abatement
costs reinforces the case for earlier and stronger measures.
From an economic policy perspective, the argument against awaiting
greater certainty is that "later" may be too late to take effective action. "The
lag time between emission of the gases and their full impact is on the order of
decades to centuries."'" Thus the effects of global warming may be almost
"irreversible," a term which has important implications for economic and
policy analysis. Economists Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckhauser conclude that
"states that are not unattractive in themselves should perhaps be avoided even
at considerable cost because they increase the likelihood of future transit to
undesirable states."'19
If there is uncertainty, however, about whether the effects are irreversible,
then we may learn something valuable during the gradual transition toward the
potentially irreversible state.20 By cautiously moving toward a global warming
state, society may learn more about its potential effects. More informed (and
hence efficient) action can follow. Nonetheless, if policymakers are risk averse,
the potential for irreversible harm from global warming may outweigh the
informational gains of moving toward the global warming state.2 ' Even if the
alternative methods of acquiring information appear "more expensive,"
policymakers may prefer them on the theory that they are "buying insurance"
against the possibly irreversible and catastrophic effects of global warming.
2
Cline weighs the value of future learning against the exponentially
increasing nature of the greenhouse warming damage function and the potential
irreversibility of the accumulation of GHG's. He concludes that there should
be a ten-year "phase-in" period of modest cost measures which also provide
protection against long-term irreversible harm.23 Because Cline argues that
ultimately there should be an extremely aggressive GHG abatement effort,24
such a phase-in period should arguably include negotiation of an international
agreement that would allow the world to take advantage of marginal
18. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CHANGING BY DEGREES: STEPS TO
REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES 3 (1991) [hereinafter CHANGING BY DEGREES].
19. NV. Kip Viscusi & Richard Zeckhauser Environmental Policy Choice Under Uncertainty, J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT., Oct. 1976, at 97, 105.
20. Id. at 108.
21. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 311.
22. See id. at 303-05; JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & RAI GUPTA, CONTROLLING THE GREENHOUSE EFFECF:
FIVE GLOBAL REGIMES COMPARED 7-8 (Brookings Occasional Papers, 1990).
23. CLINE, supra note 8, at 310-11. "This initial modest level of costs helps resolve the tension
between the need to begin a relatively aggressive program of action sooner rather than later, on the one
hand, and the high return to further scientific verification, on the other." Id. at 311.
24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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efficiencies of action on a global scale and thereby minimize the costs of the
aggressive abatement program advocated by Cline.'
Nordhaus, in contrast, views the costs of delaying significant action for ten
years as minimal.26 Nevertheless, he suggests that because GHG emissions
have been an externality which industries have not had to consider when
making production decisions, even extremely low-cost measures that could
have reduced GHG emissions have not yet been implemented. Nordhaus
therefore argues that restrained measures could be adopted in the short term
at very low cost.27 Because "[tihe first units of reduction of CO2 and other
greenhouse gases are virtually free," 28 such restrained action arguably does
not require international agreement; nations should be motivated to take such
action on their own purely to promote their own economic welfare. z9 Under
the Nordhaus analysis, the costs of more aggressive action exceed the
benefits; 30 hence, the need for an international agreement is less pressing than
it is under the Cline analysis.
From a global efficiency perspective, however, the Nordhaus analysis
contains a major flaw. As Nordhaus acknowledges, "the empirical estimates
[of costs of abatement] apply primarily to data for the United States, while we
have extended these to apply to the global economy.'' 31 Yet there is strong
evidence that U.S. cost data cannot be applied to the global economy because
the marginal costs of abatement vary considerably among nations.32 If the
world can negotiate an agreement that would allow nations to take advantage
of the greater marginal efficiency of abatement action over a wider range of
investment levels in developing nations, as will be argued below,33 then all
nations would enjoy lower costs and greater net benefits from abatement action
than they would realize if they merely implemented individual domestic
abatement measures. Hence, if GHG abatement is undertaken on a global scale,
25. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
26. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ROLLING THE "DICE": AN OPTIMAL TRANSITION PATH FOR
CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES 18-19 & tbl. I (Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale
University Discussion Paper No. 1019, 1992).
27. Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 41; Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 923, 936.
28. Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 41.
29. This reasoning may help explain why numerous OECD nations have unilaterally adopted GHG
emissions abatement targets. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Notably, however, the U.S. did not
join this movement among developed countries, although there are signs that it may do so under the Clinton
Administration, see infra note 87 and accompanying text, especially given Vice President Gore's strong
commitment to immediate action on GHG abatement. See Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(1991).
30. Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 934 & tbl. 7. The 20% level of GHG reduction from baseline would
cost $16.3 billion per year, more than five times as much as Nordhaus' efficient 11% level, and would lead
to a net loss of $4.4 billion per year. Id.
31. Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 63; see also Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 933, 936 (acknowledging that
a complete assessment of the impact of global warming should include regions outside the U.S. but
concluding that lack of data makes conclusions about other areas impossible).
32. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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the cost of abatement could be considerably less than Nordhaus predicts. This
possibility casts serious doubt on Nordhaus' conclusion that the benefits of
aggressive abatement action do not outweigh the costs. When the lower costs
from more efficient international action are considered, the marginal cost of
abatement curve shifts down (right), and a higher level of abatement activity
becomes efficient. Because Cline's analysis suggests that an aggressive
international GHG abatement regime would be efficient, and one could infer
from Nordhaus' analysis that moderate action may be efficient, this Note will
proceed on the assumption that the benefits of moderate to aggressive
international efforts to limit GHG emissions would exceed the costs.
I. OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION TO THE GREENHOUSE
WARMING PROBLEM
A. The "Cooperator's Loss" Model
Greenhouse gas emissions disperse throughout the global atmosphere
whatever the source of the emissions, and the benefits of any abatement
activities are similarly shared by the world as a whole?4 Hence, nations have
strong incentives to "free ride" on the actions of other nations.35 Numerous
analysts have therefore argued for an international solution. 6
Because of the "free rider" problem, Cline has pointed out that the
Prisoner's Dilemma serves as a useful model for the difficulties involved in
negotiating an international GHG abatement agreement.37 In the classic
Prisoner's Dilemma, because each party perceives noncooperation as
maximizing its individual welfare, there is a perverse incentive for two parties
not to cooperate even though cooperation would maximize total benefit.38 In
34. Gary E. Marchant, Global Warming: Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for
Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 636 (1992); James K. Sebenius, Crafting a Winning
Coalition: Negotiating a Regime to Control Global Warming, in GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING
A GLOBAL REGIME, supra note I, at 69, 73; see also POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at 3-4.
35. CLINE, supra note 8, at 327-28; Sebenius, supra note 34, at 73.
36. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at 2; T.C. Schelling, Economic Responses to Global
Wrming: Prospects for Cooperative Approaches, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES
197, 198 (Rudiger Dornbusch & James M. Poterba eds., 1991); see also MICHAEL GRUBB, THE
GREENHOUSE EFFECT: NEGOTIATING TARGETS 2 (1989).
37. CLINE, supra note 8, at 325-27.
38. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-9 (1984). Thus, in one example of the
game, both players receive 3 points if there is mutual cooperation, for a total of 6, and I point if there is
mutual noncooperation, for a total of 2. If one player cooperates while the other does not, the cooperating
player (the "sucker") receives no points, while the noncooperating player (the "defector") receives 5 points,
for a total of 5. The matrix below illustrates this classic Prisoner's Dilemma:
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the global warming context, each nation may perceive that the individual costs
of its abatement action exceed the benefits it will realize, since the benefits of
abatement are dispersed globally. Hence, absent an enforceable international
agreement, individual nations may lack incentives for unilateral action.3
But there is an additional complication which differentiates negotiation on
global warming from the Prisoner's Dilemma. Certain nations may have more
to lose by cooperating in an international GHG abatement scheme than they
have to lose from unabated global warming itself, even though the value of
their cooperation to the world might exceed their internalized costs of
cooperating.40 Using the above notation,4 this group of nations would face
a preference ordering of DC > DD > CC > CD. When both players have this
preference ordering, the game is called "Deadlock," which is different from the
Prisoner's Dilemma (DC > CC > DD > CD) because mutual cooperation is not
preferred to mutual defection.4" Yet in the scenario described here one group
of nations prefers mutual cooperation to mutual defection (CC to DD) and one
group prefers the opposite (DD to CC). This situation is neither completely a




Cooperate 3 1 3 0 I 5
Player A I
Defect 5 1 0 1 1
Using the notation that has been developed for game theory, with C representing "cooperate" and D
representing "defect," in a Prisoner's Dilemma each player has a preference ordering of
DC > CC > DD > CD from her individual perspective, with the first letter in each pair representing what
the player herself does, and the second letter representing what the player's opponent does. See Kenneth
A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY 1, 7 (Kenneth Oye ed., 1986). Thus, each player has an incentive to defect, no matter what the
other player does, since DC > CC, and DD > CD. However, from a global perspective (the perspective of
a strategist standing outside the game whose goal is to maximize the total number of points), the preference
ordering would be CC > (DC = CD) > DD, where "=" indicates that a strategist would be indifferent
between two outcomes. The "equilibrium outcome" in a Prisoner's Dilemma (DD) is thus the least
preferable position from this perspective. The equilibrium outcome is defined as "one from which neither
player can shift without impairing his payoff, assuming that the other player does not shift." ANATOL
RAPOPORT ET AL., THE 2 X 2 GAME 18 (1976). It is therefore the outcome that will prevail absent
communication and cooperation between the parties to achieve a different outcome.
39. Even though numerous European Community and OECD nations have made unilateral
commitments to limit GHG emissions, infra note 83 and accompanying text, some members of the
European Community have argued that they should not move forward with plans for a carbon tax, since
unabated GHG emissions in the U.S. would simply undercut their own abatement efforts. Lakshman
Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding Matrix, 22 ENVTL. L. 77, 79 (1992).
40. The ensuing discussion assumes the organization of nations into two groups, each acting as a
single "player"-one group believing that its costs in an international GHG abatement regime would exceed
its share of the benefits, and the other believing that its share of the benefits would exceed its costs.
41. See supra note 38.
42. Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY, supra note 38, at 226, 230.
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Prisoner's Dilemma nor a Deadlock, but an asymmetric4 3 combination of the
two, as one player has a Prisoner's Dilemma preference ordering, and the other
player has a Deadlock preference ordering. I will refer to this asymmetric
game as the Cooperator's Loss: one party must suffer a loss in order to reach
the cooperative solution that maximizes total welfare 4
In the global warming context, when the costs of abatement to a given
nation are greater than that nation's share of the total gains from abatement,
that nation will have no incentive to strive for the cooperative solution, and
there is a Cooperator's Loss. Therefore, to induce cooperation in a
Cooperator's Loss situation, part of the overall gain must be transferred from
one "player" to the other.
B. Examples of Potential Cooperator's Losses
It is currently impossible to know which if any nations would suffer a
Cooperator's Loss, given uncertainties about global warming's extent and the
distribution of its effects among the regions of the world.45 Nonetheless, when
accounting for current expectations about the costs and benefits of GHG
abatement, various nations throughout the world may expect that they would
face a Cooperator's Loss-i.e., that they would be worse off as individual
nations under an abatement regime than they would be in a "business as usual"
scenario. T\vo classes of nations may reasonably believe that they face the
"loser's" preference ordering46 in a Cooperator's Loss: first, Third World
43. GLENN H. SNYDER & PAUL DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: BARGAINING, DECISION
MAKING, AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES 46 (1977).
44. Using a game theory matrix, an example of a Cooperator's Loss is illustrated below:
FIGURE 2. The Cooperator's Loss
Player B
Cooperate Defect
A B A B
Cooperate 4 2 0 1 5
Player A
Defect 5 1 0 1 1 3
Player A has a preference ordering of DC > CC > DD > CD as in a Prisoner's Dilemma, while player B
has a preference ordering of DC > DD > CC > CD as in Deadlock. The preference ordering from a global
utility maximizing perspective is CC > (DC = CD) > DD as in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
45. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT xxiv, 157-58 & fig. 5.4 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 1990)
[hereinafter IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT]; Sebenius, supra note 34, at 73-74; William K. Stevens,
Estimates of Warming Gain More Precision and Warn of Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at Cl; see
also EPSTEIN & GUPTA, supra note 22, at 6 (pointing out that regional impacts are not reflected in global
surface warming estimates).
46. In the ensuing discussion, the "loser's" preference ordering corresponds to the Deadlock side of
the Cooperator's Loss (DC > DD > CC > CD); the "winner's" preference ordering corresponds to the
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nations whose gains from rapid industrialization may outweigh the shared
welfare loss from unabated global warming; 4" second, industrialized nations,
in particular the U.S., whose dependence upon GHG-emitting fuels and
industries is so severe that the costs to them of significantly reducing GHG
emissions would outweigh !their share of the global benefits of such
reduction. 48 The Cooperator's Loss model may thus help explain why both
LDC's and the U.S. have been reluctant to enter into a GHG abatement
agreement committing these nations to particular target reductions.49
1. Less Developed Countries Facing a Cooperator's Loss
The proposition that the Third World faces a Cooperator's Loss is
controversial. Because LDC's economies depend upon agriculture more than
the economies of industrialized nations, some have argued that Third World
nations face a more significant threat from global warming than do developed
nationsf 0 This argument implies that LDC's might have more to gain than
to lose from a GHG abatement regime, and therefore do not face a
Cooperator's Loss, since abatement would avert the climate change that might
otherwise disrupt LDC's agricultural system.
In proposing that LDC's may face a Cooperator's Loss, this Note
challenges the above argument on several grounds. First, most of the current
climate change models predict that regions closer to the equator will face far
less extreme temperature changes than areas closer to the poles.5 , Second,
Prisoner's Dilemma side of the Cooperator's Loss (DC > CC > DD > CD).
47. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
48. See Guruswamy, supra note 39, at 77; Treaty Ratification Urged by Gore, Reilly, Industry,
Environmentalists, 1992 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 183 (Sept. 21, 1992); cf. Money, U.S. Position
Remain Barriers for Accord on Climate Change Issues, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 502 (Sept. 27, 1991)
(pointing out that because U.S. is endowed with large coal reserves, it is reluctant to agree to fossil fuel
reduction targets).
A third group may also face the loser's preference ordering: nations in extremely cold regions that
might actually benefit from the effects of global warming. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 332 (suggesting that
agricultural effects of global warming would benefit a few high latitude nations, including Denmark,
Finland, and Iceland). Finally, current generations may face a Cooperator's Loss with respect to future
generations which might reap the larger portion of the benefits from GHG abatement action taken in the
short term. See Sebenius, supra note 34, at 73 (arguing that individual nations and industries have less
incentive to reduce emissions than they would have if the benefits of abatement action were felt
immediately). Discussion of a potential Cooperator's Loss in these two situations is beyond the scope of
this Note. For an argument that nations have an obligation to consider the interests of future generations
when designing environmental policy, see Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future
Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 198 (1990).
49. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text; GRUBB, supra note 36, at 24 (pointing out
developing countries' resistance to constraints on future emissions of GHG's); Rio Conference, supra note
I, at 207 (stating that the Convention on Climate Change was watered down at U.S. insistence); Christopher
D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 445, 453 (1992).
50. Schelling, supra note 36, at 202-03; Greenhouse Economists Still Disagree, But Some Differences
Begin to Narrow, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., May 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ZEVI
File.
51. Beckerman, supra note 9, at 57; William R. Cline, Comment on Economic Responses to Global
Warming: Prospects for Cooperative Approaches, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES,
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industrialization in LDC's, with its concomitant economic benefits, is closely
tied to increasing GHG emissions. 2 Hence, if LDC's are required to
implement industry-suppressing GHG abatement strategies, they would forgo
the economic benefits that would accrue to them from unrestrained
industrialization. Such gains arguably exceed the agricultural losses that
LDC's would face under global warming,54 especially considering that LDC's
are generally clustered in equatorial regions where temperature changes will
be less severe.55 The World Bank's 1992 Development and the Environment
report argues that developing nations would gain more from industrialization
than from GHG abatement. 6 Third, it has been argued that a clean
environment is a "luxury" good that developing nations value less than do
industrialized nations.5 Finally, if Third World nations do industrialize at the
expense of GHG abatement, their economies will be that much less dependent
upon agriculture, and the effects of global warming upon their economies will
be that much less severe. Developing nations could therefore lose more
from GHG abatement activity than they would gain.
Although the Third World may face a Cooperator's Loss, numerous
commentators have suggested that from an international perspective the
marginal efficiency of GHG abatement in the Third World would probably
exceed the efficiency of such investment in the developed world over a wider
range of investment levels.5 9 For example, relatively low cost improvements
supra note 36, at 222, 225-26; see also IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 45, at 157-58 & fig. 5.4
(indicating that areas closer to equator may experience less extreme temperature change from global
warming).
52. Michael Weisskopf, Global Warming Rift Threatens Treaty: U.N. Talks Close With Industrialized
Nations, Third World at Odds, vASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1992, at A3.
53. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 2053; Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive
Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83,
107 (1992).
54. GRUBB, supra note 36, at 20.
55. GHG abatement need not involve major sacrifices to industrialization if "green technologies" are
implemented, but the green technology option would not be available to LDC's absent cooperation and
technology transfer from the developed world. Green technology transfer will be advocated below as part
of the strategy for resolving the developing world's Cooperator's Loss while minimizing the global costs
of GHG abatement. See infra text accompanying notes 107-109.
56. Sylvia Nasar, Conference in Rio: The Rich vs. the Poor; Cooling the Globe Would be Nice, But
Saving Lives Now May Cost Less, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, § 4, at 6 (citing 1992 World Bank Report).
57. Stewart, supra note 4, at 2052. "Because of their more urgent need for economic development,
citizens of developing countries often place a lower value on reducing environmental externalities than
citizens of developed countries." Id. at 2099.
58. See Nasar, supra note 56.
59. See, e.g., CLINE, supra note 8, at 338-40 (arguing that there is great potential for low cost
abatement measures in developing countries because of relatively inefficient energy use as compared to
Western Europe and use of energy subsidies); JOSE GOLDEMBERG ET AL., ENERGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE
WORLD 86 (1987) (arguing that implementation of modernized, efficient energy technologies in the
developing world would be less costly than using conventional, less efficient technologies and increased
energies supplies); Morgenstern, supra note 11, at 140; Stewart & Wiener, supra note 53, at 108; Urgent
Use of Realistic Pricing Systems, Economic Reporting Methods Needed in East, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA),
Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIED File; cf. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra. note 7,
at 47 (suggesting that efforts in developing nations could prove to be most efficient strategy for U.S.).
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in environmental technology and design efficiency in developing nations, using
technology already available in the industrialized world, could have a much
greater impact in reducing GHG emissions than higher cost improvements in
developed nations. The relatively low cost of such improvements in developing
countries, however, does not imply that the globally efficient solution would
come at low cost to developing nations. Rather, the globally efficient GHG
abatement program may require greater overall investment in LDC's, in order
to take advantage of these marginal efficiencies. Moreover, differences in
standards of living and the availability of "green technologies" between the
developing and developed worlds may mean that an abatement cost which is
low by industrialized nations' standards is nonetheless quite burdensome in
developing countries.
Given that roughly three-quarters of the world's population resides in
developing nations, 6° and that efficiency interests require that investment in
GHG abatement be concentrated in the developing world, I hypothesize for the
sake of illustration below that it will be efficient to require roughly twice as
much GHG abatement investment in developing nations as in developed
nations. Based on my analysis regarding the greater marginal efficiency of
abatement in developing nations over a wider range of investment levels, such
investment might achieve an efficient (though not necessarily equitable)
distribution of burdens between the developed and the developing worlds. 6,
A compromise between Nordhaus' and Cline's conclusions about the
efficient level of abatement action suggests that approximately $33 billion62
of investment per year worldwide might lead to an efficient level of
abatement. According to the hypothesis in the previous paragraph, the
efficient solution might then require about $10 B of investment in the
developed world and $23 B of investment in the developing world (to take
advantage of the higher marginal efficiency of investment in the developing
world over a wider range of investment levels). Suppose that each nation is
responsible for the costs of abatement activity in its own nation.64 Applying
60. CHANGING BY DEGREES, supra note 18, at 33, fig. 1-11 (1991).
61. Efficiency should not be confused with equity. So far, the discussion has addressed only the issue
of minimizing the total costs of GHG abatement. Minimizing total costs, however, is an important first step
toward an equitable solution, as it reduces the international burden in achieving GHG abatement, and thus,
all other things being equal, increases a nation's willingness to accept its share of the reduced burden. The
resolution to the Cooperator's Loss problem, below, will involve a transfer of resources that addresses the
equity issue.
62. Hereinafter, billion is abbreviated "B."
63. A $33 B per year investment would lead to a 25-30% reduction from baseline, according to
Nordhaus' cost data. Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 934. This figure is between the 11% reduction from
baseline Nordhaus advocates, id. at 934, and the more than 70% reduction from baseline Cline advocates
in the long term, see CLINE, supra note 8, at 309. In the short term, Cline advocates roughly 25% reduction
from baseline by the year 2000. See id. at 290 tbl. 7.2, 369 (advocating 20% reduction from 1990 levels
by the year 2000, which is the same as 25% reduction from year 2000 baseline levels).
64. This assumption follows from the idea that a sovereign nation should be responsible for the costs
of pollution control within its own borders. In resolving the Cooperator's Loss below, however, this
assumption will be re-examined.
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Cline's conclusion that the final weighted benefit-cost ratio is 1.26,65 the total
benefit from investment when there is global cooperation is $33 B x 1.26 =
$42 B, while the net benefit is $42 B - $33 B = $9 B.66
Assume that the developed and the developing worlds share the benefits
of GHG abatement fifty-fifty, each receiving $21 B. 67 The net return to the
developed world, which invests $10 B, is 21 - 10 = $11 B. The net loss to the
developing world, which invests $23 B, is 21 - 23 = $-2 B. The northwest
("total cooperation") quadrant of the matrix below reflects these returns.
68
The northeast and southwest quadrants reflect the situation when only one side
or the other cooperates, but not both.69 The resulting choice matrix is
illustrated below:
65. CLINE, supra note 8, at 300.
66. As numerous economists have pointed out, many of the benefits of global warming are difficult
to quantify in dollar terms, such as preservation of coastal wetlands and biological diversity. Morgenstern
has criticized some economists, including Nordhaus, for failing to account for such benefits. Morgenstem,
supra note 1I, at 140, 141-42. The model proposed in this Note does not assume such benefits should be
ignored, but rather assumes they can somehow be quantified in dollar terms.
67. This is a simplifying assumption, but not an arbitrary one: as noted above, the developing world
has nearly three-quarters of the world's population, but temperature change will be less severe closer to the
equator. Moreover, if a clean environment is a "luxury good" that is valued less by developing nations, see
supra note 57 and accompanying text, then the benefits of abatement action will be valued less in the Third
World than in the First World. Hence, the developing world may have less to gain per capita from GHG
abatement than the developed world.
68. For the sake of clarity, dollar signs and billions are omitted from the matrixes.
69. In the northeast quadrant, the First World invests its $10 B in abatement activity, with a return to
the world as a whole of $12 B; however, the LDC's do not make any investment. The return to the First
World is $6 B (its half of the benefit) minus $10 B (its investment) for a net total of -$4 B (a $4 B loss);
the return to the Third World is simply $6 B (its half of the benefit) since it makes no investment. In the
southwest quadrant, the Third World invests its $23 B in abatement activity, with a return to the world as
a whole of $30 B. The return to the First World is simply $15 B (its half of the benefit), while the return
to the Third World is $15 B minus $23 B (its investment), for a net $8 B loss. The percentage return from
Third World investment alone (roughly 30% of its investment) is greater than the percentage return from
First World investment alone (20% of its investment) because the marginal efficiency of investment in the
developing world is greater over a wider range of investment levels. See supra notes 59 & 66 and
accompanying text. In the southeast ("no cooperation") scenario, there is simply no investment and no
return; this is the "business as usual" scenario. It should be noted that if the First and Third Worlds
cooperate to attain the overall efficient solution, the marginal efficiency of investment in each part of the
world will be equal when the world reaches its equilibrium level of investment.
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The First World's preference ordering is DC > CC > DD > CD (the Prisoner's
Dilemma side of the Cooperator's Loss). The Third World's preference
ordering is DC > DD > CC > CD (the Deadlock side of the Cooperator's
Loss). The globally efficient preference ordering is CC > DC > CD > DD. The
key point is that the Third World's contribution is efficient from a global
perspective, but the Third World would nonetheless prefer the completely
noncooperative solution 7° over the cooperative solution.7'
In this example, in order to make the Third World prefer the total
cooperative solution (international abatement) over the total noncooperative
solution (no abatement), the First World would have to transfer back7" to the
developing world at least $2 B gained from the cooperation.73 The choice
matrix would then appear as follows:74
70. Southeast quadrant, with total net returns of 0, and net returns to the Third World of 0.
71. Northwest quadrant, with total net returns of $9 B, but net loss to the Third World of $2 B.
72. Such transfers are appropriately viewed as a return of what is owed, rather than a "gift," to
cooperating developing nations, since their cooperation creates a benefit which might otherwise be reaped
exclusively by developed nations.
73. In order to make the developing world actually prefer the efficient solution, the developed world
would have to transfer slightly more than $2 B, or $2 B + e, where r = a minimal amount. To simplify
the notation, this Note omits the r 's and assumes throughout that a "player" will always cooperate when
it is indifferent between two alternatives.
74. Part III, infra, will discuss a possible regime for making such a transfer. Note that game theory
requires a transfer of only $2 B. Arguably, equity would require the developed world to transfer even more
of its gain to the Third World, as a $2 B transfer would still leave it with $9 B gain, and the Third World
at the break even point. A more equitable solution would be a transfer of $6.5 B, leaving each "side" with
a gain of $4.5 B over the noncooperative solution. Also note that from a theoretical perspective, a
threatened sanction against the developing world of $2 B in the noncooperative scenario would be equally
effective for the purposes of inducing cooperation. As argued more fully below, infra note 94, sanctions
would be unfeasible when a large number of countries do not cooperate because the threat of sanctions
would not be credible. Aside from unfeasibility, however, the sanctions would be gravely inequitable as
the First World would reap the benefits of the Third World's abatement expenditures.
1st 3rd 1st
11 -2 -4 6
1 I15 1-8 fo S 0
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Yet even after such a transfer the classic Prisoner's Dilemma situation remains:
in the absence of a binding agreement, each side, examining its own options
as a profit maximizer, would choose not to cooperate. At this point, the
introduction of an international agreement could induce cooperation if it
imposes tariff penalties against noncooperators so that the net gain to either
side in the cooperative scenario exceeds its net gain in the noncooperative
scenario. On the basis of Figure 4, the Third World would have to transfer $6
B to the First World in the northeast quadrant as a tariff penalty for non-
cooperation, and the First World would have to transfer $6 B to the Third
World in the southwest quadrant as a similar penalty. 5
The final result, including the initial transfer to the Third World and
subsequent tariff penalties for noncooperation, would be depicted as
follows:
7 6
FIGURE 5. The Resolution: The LDC Cooperator's Loss





1st 3rd 1 1st 3rd
9 0 -4 6
151-8 0 0
[st i 3rd lst i 3rd
9 0 2 0
9 -2 0 0
75. It is coincidental that these figures lead to an equivalent penalty tariff for both the developing and
developed worlds. An equivalent tariff is not an inherent feature of the Cooperator's Loss or the Prisoner's
Dilemma.
76. Since we are dealing with the entire world in this example, the tariff on the noncooperator would
have to accrue to the benefit of the cooperator-which is not only a necessary result, but a just one.
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The First World has preferences of CC > DC > CD > DD, and the Third
World has preferences of CC > (DC = DD) > CD.77 Hence, under the
conditions illustrated in Figure 5, the best choice for each block of countries
acting as self-interested wealth maximizers is now total cooperation. Note that
the tariff penalties in the northeast and southwest quadrants must be credible
threats in order to induce cooperation, but in the presence of cooperation, such
threats need not be carried out. The form of the threats could be an
internationally negotiated import tariff against the products from a
noncooperating nation. The Montreal Protocol regulating chlorofluorocarbon
(CFC) emissions provides a precedent for such a punitive action.7" In
contrast, the transfer of $2 B from the developed world to the developing
world in the northwest quadrant must take place, as the developing world
would have no economic incentive to cooperate without it.
2. The United States: Cooperator's Loss in an Industrialized Country
with Severe Dependence on GHG-Emitting Fuels and Technologies
While the above analysis indicates that a transfer of resources to the Third
World may be necessary in order to achieve an efficient abatement regime, the
U.S. has been reluctant to make such transfers. Indeed the U.S. has thus far
declined to take any active role in worldwide GHG abatement efforts.79 It has
been argued that an international accord cannot be reached without U.S.
participation, if not U.S. leadership.80 With 5% of the world's population and
25% of the world's GNP, the U.S. accounts for almost 25% of global GHG
emissions, 81 making it the world's leading contributor.8 2 Under the Bush
Administration, the U.S. was the only member of the 24-nation Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the only industrialized nation
worldwide that had not committed to freezing CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by
the year 2000.83 Especially following the United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development in the summer of 1992,84 the U.S. was
77. These preferences will result, assuming that players choose cooperation over defection when the
payoff between the two is the same. This assumption is not essential to the outcome, as an additional e
could have been transferred in each case. See supra note 73.
78. Stewart, supra note 4, at 2101.
79. Schelling, supra note 36, at 206. U.S. policy on global warming, however, has begun to shift under
the Clinton Administration. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
80. Id.; Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1484, 1547-
50 (1991).
81. GRUBB, supra note 36, at 15-16; Thomas F. Berg, Global Warming on Capitol Hill, PUB. UTIL.
FoRT., Sept. 1, 1991, at 30.
82. Stone, supra note 49, at 453.
83. Berg, supra note 81; Weisskopf, supra note 52, at A3; see also CHANGING BY DEGREES, supra
note 18, at 7 n.6 (naming a dozen industrialized nations that have pledged to stabilize or reduce CO2
emissions by 2005); CLINE, supra note 8, at 324.
84. See Rio Conference, supra note 1, at 207.
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gaining a reputation as a spoiler of international agreement on global
warming.85
President Clinton has recently repudiated Bush Administration policy on
GHG abatement,86 and during the campaign advocated a domestic market-
based CO2 tradeable emissions permit system similar to the international
system proposed in Part III of this Note.87 It is worthwhile to consider
whether aggressive U.S. action to reduce GHG emissions would conflict with
the Clinton Administration's economic recovery goals.88 Economists Alan
Manne and Richard Richels estimate that freezing emissions at their 1990 rate
through 2000 and gradually reducing them to 80% of this rate by the year
2020 (a more aggressive plan than the one advocated by President Clinton)
9
would cost the U.S. up to $3.6 trillion by 2100.90 While the Manne & Richels
study does not estimate the potential benefits of abatement, William Nordhaus
has argued that the U.S. economy, like that of other industrial and service-
based economies, is less affected by outside climate because most industrial
and service activities take place indoors. 9 Finally, because the U.S. emits the
largest amount of GHG's,92 in any GHG abatement regime in which the
burden of cleanup costs is distributed on the basis of historical and current
emissions, the U.S. will absorb a huge proportion of the world's abatement
costs and reap a much smaller percentage of the benefits.
Hence, there is a strong case to be made that the U.S. faces a Cooperator's
Loss, a possibility which raises complex questions of international relations
and ethics. Should transfers be made to the U.S., one of the world's richest
nations, in order to induce its participation in a GHG abatement regime?
Alternatively, should the U.S. be willing to make an economic "sacrifice,"
participating in a GHG abatement regime for the greater good of the world?
After winning the campaign on promises of promoting domestic economic
concerns, 93 it is doubtful that Bill Clinton will attempt to persuade the
85. See Berg, supra note 81.
86. In a speech to environmental groups to mark Earth Day, he committed the U.S. "to reducing our
emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000." Richard L. Berke, Clinton Supports
Two Major Steps for Environment, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1993, at Al.
87. Thomas F. Berg, Presidential Candidates Discuss Energy Issues, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1992,
at 38.
88. Debate is emerging within the Clinton Administration over the potential conflict between Clinton's
economic policy goals and his campaign promise to freeze CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.
See Keith Schneider, Gore Meets Resistance in Effort for Steps on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, April 19,
1993, at A17. The permit-based GHG abatement regime outlined in Part III of this Note could help resolve
the conflict between these two goals.
89. See supra note 86. This level of abatement is also more aggressive than the plan advocated by
Cline. See CLINE, supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
90. Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, CO2 Emission Limits: An Economic Costs Analysis for the
USA, 11 ENERGY J. 51, 65, 68 (1990).
91. Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 930-33. But Nordhaus' analysis has been criticized for ignoring whole
categories of potential damages. See Morgenstem, supra note 11, at 141-42.
92. GRUBB, supra note 36, at 15-17; see also Stone, supra note 49, at 453.
93. Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats; Clinton, Gazing Beyond Nov. 3, Outlines Vision,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al; Doyle McManus, After the Cold War What is Security?; As Issues of
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American public to make such a sacrifice. Yet nations throughout the world,
whether industrialized or developing, would chafe at the idea of making
economic transfers to the U.S., a major cause of the problem through its past
and present industrial activity and extravagant use of resources. The U.S.
position is thus distinguishable from that of LDC's, which threaten to
contribute to the global warming problem in their effort to "catch up" to
industrialized nations. Any resolution to the international deadlock on GHG
abatement could thus significantly affect the distribution of global wealth and
power, and herein perhaps lies a major obstacle to achieving international
agreement. A successful international regime, then, would have to induce
cooperation by allowing each nation to reap part of the benefit from GHG
abatement.94
The next Part of this Note will propose that a market-based international
tradeable emissions permit (ITEP) system could help fulfill this goal and
resolve the negotiation deadlock by not only promoting efficient GHG
abatement on a global scale, but also by providing a means for distributing the
burden of GHG abatement equitably and flexibly. Each nation's eventual
benefit under an ITEP system would likely equal or exceed its costs. Even if
the U.S. does not enjoy a net economic gain under such a system, however,
it would enjoy the political benefits of being an active participant in an
international GHG abatement regime at minimal CoSt.95 U.S. participation
would therefore help relieve the strain in relations with its European allies over
the GHG abatement issue,96 improve relations with developing nations, and
help secure the participation of the latter in a global GHG abatement
regime.
97
III. MARKET-BASED POLICY OPTIONS
Several decades ago, market-based environmental regulation was a novel
concept, but now it is hardly controversial to assert that market-based
Anti-Communism and Military Intervention Recede, the Focus is on Economic Strength, L.A. TIMEs, OcL
17, 1992, at A].
94. One could argue that nations in a Cooperator's Loss could be induced to cooperate not only by
making transfers of wealth, but by threatening punitive action if they do not cooperate. Such a method
would only work, however, if there were just a few weak nations that could be isolated by the world such
that the penalty threat was credible. Given the powerful economic and political position of the U.S., and
the potential for a Cooperator's Loss in other world powers such as China, see Sebenius, supra note 34,
at 79, and the reluctance of oil-producing nations to join an international accord that would threaten their
main export, see Rio Conference, supra note 1, at 207, it appears unlikely that the threat of sanctions would
be sufficiently credible to bring all of the potential noncooperators into line.
95. See Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating U.S. and International Law, 32 ARIZ.
L. REV. 221, 265 (1990).
96. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 324-25; When to Act on Climate Change: The Debate Continues as
Action Begins, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Aug. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ZEVI
File.
97. See GRUBB, supra note 36, at 24.
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approaches can lead to more effective environmental regulation at less cost
than command-and-control approaches.9" Choosing between available market
mechanisms, however, has led to significant disagreement. In the GHG
abatement context there is no consensus.99 The two primary market
mechanisms suggested for limiting GHG emissions are carbon taxes and
tradeable carbon permits."l° The former method involves charging for each
unit of emissions at a level that ideally matches the harm caused by that unit.
The latter involves determining the overall efficient quantity of emissions, then
allocating (or auctioning) emissions permits, which may be traded or sold
between industries or nations.
This Part proposes that in light of the Cooperator's Loss problem outlined
above, an international tradeable emissions permit (ITEP) system would be the
preferable market-based approach. Because the ITEP system enables each
nation to realize a gain from abatement activity by providing the easiest means
of allocating and re-allocating GHG abatement costs, it helps resolve the
Cooperator's Loss described in Part II. Moreover, an analysis of the
characteristics of the global warming cost-benefit curves shows that the ITEP
system is a more efficient means of GHG abatement than market-based fees
or taxes.
A. Implementing Tradeable Permits to Resolve the Cooperator's Loss
1. The ITEP System's Superiority to Taxes in Making Transfers Required
to Resolve the Cooperator's Loss
As discussed above, a successful international GHG abatement regime
would make transfers back to nations whose costs of abatement exceed their
individual benefits.' 0' Because a tax system would require outright transfers
of wealth between nations while the ITEP system could achieve the wealth
98. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New
Era for an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Marehant, supra note 34, at 629-30; Robert N. Stavins
& Bradley W. Whitehead, The Greening of America's Taxes: Pollution Charges and Environmental
Protection, 13 PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST. REP. 7 (1992); Stewart, supra note 4, at 2093-97. In general,
command-and-control approaches require specific procedures or technologies to be applied, such as the
scrubbers that industries were required to install to remove sulfur dioxide from emissions under the 1977
Clean Air Act. See Marchant, supra note 34, at 629 & n.21. Market-based approaches set a standard or a
fee but allow industries to determine the most cost-effective means of compliance. Id.
99. Compare CLINE, supra note 8, at 369-70 and Stavins & Whitehead, supra note 98, at 17-20
(advocating tax or fee-based systems) with GRUBB, supra note 36, at 41, Marchant, supra note 34, at 631-
35, and Stewart & Wiener, supra note 53, at 106-08 (advocating permit systems).
100. Marchant, supra note 34, at 628-29; Stavins & Whitehead, supra note 98, at 6; Stewart, supra
note 4, at 2094; see also EPSTEIN & GUPTA, supra note 22, at 14 (concluding that while there are other
possible regimes for limiting GHG emissions, only tax and marketable permits can maximize economic
efficiency of GHG abatement by "equalizing" marginal costs across abatement activities).
101. See supra notes 40-49, 72 and accompanying text.
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transfer through the allocation of permits itself, the ITEP system is better
suited to resolving the Cooperator's Loss than a tax system. 2
A tax system that maximizes the marginal efficiencies of international
action would have to impose the same level of taxes on industry throughout
the world.10 3 However, if a uniform tax were imposed on an international
scale, industries in LDC's would be likely to suffer more than those in
developed nations, because the latter have greater access to green technologies
and because differences in levels of national wealth would make a moderate
tax in developed nations seem exorbitant in LDC's. 1° Since LDC's are
among those nations likely to find themselves in a Cooperator's Loss, a tax
system would only exacerbate the Cooperator's Loss problem by favoring
developed nations. The Cooperator's Loss could then be resolved only through
direct transfers of resources or revenue from developed nations to LDC's-an
unwieldy, ad hoc solution to the problem.
In contrast, an ITEP system would resolve the Cooperator's Loss through
the distribution of permits itself while still limiting emissions to an efficient
level."°5 After international policymakers set a quantity level for global GHG
emissions, as they must under a permit system, the permits could be allocated
to account for the Cooperator's Loss. In other words, a relatively large number
of permits would be allocated to those nations facing the "loser's" preferences
under a Cooperator's Loss. Because the permits would be saleable or leasable
on an international scale, an allocation of permits favoring LDC's (or any other
nations facing "loser's" preferences) would not lead to the inefficiencies caused
by a tax system favoring certain nations.0 6 No matter what the initial
allocation, industries throughout the world would buy, sell, and lease permits
until there is a globally efficient distribution of permits.
In addition, developing nations would have incentives to purchase green
technologies from industrialized countries in order to reduce their total GHG
emissions level because they could then sell their excess permits in an
102. The ITEP system is also more efficient than the tax system in the GHG abatement context, as
will be argued below. See infra text accompanying notes 127-142.
103. To understand why the tax level would have to be internationally uniform, suppose that
international policymakers determine that the efficient tax is $100 per ton of carbon emitted, a rate
suggested by various economists. CLINE, supra note 8, at 373; Stavins & Whitehead, supra note 98, at 18-
19. If a tax of only $75 per ton were imposed on LDC's because they faced the "loser's" preferences in
a Cooperator's Loss, the industries in those nations would continue to emit GHG's until the marginal
benefit of an additional unit of emissions were less than $75 per ton. All the emissions that provided a
marginal benefit to these industries between $75 and $100 per ton would be inefficient, as the cost imposed
on society from the emissions would be $100 per ton. A uniform international tax, set at the level of harm
caused by GHG emissions, would thus be required to maximize the efficiency of an abatement regime.
104. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
105. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 270.
73 (1974) (outlining distributional and efficiency-enhancing benefits of a permit system over a tax system
in context of water pollution control).
106. See supra note 103.
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international tradeable emissions permit market. 10 7 Industries in developed
nations that would want to encourage such sale of permits might provide
favorable terms for technology transfer to industries in LDC's, or might
arrange to provide green technology directly in exchange for emissions
permits. In this way, an ITEP system would facilitate an exchange of green
technology that would both benefit industries in developed nations by making
more permits available on the international market, while promoting "clean"
industrialization and providing a source of revenue for developing
countries.0 8 The development of global markets for green technologies,
which would be fostered by their implementation in developing nations, could
provide the U.S. with additional economic benefits to help offset any potential
Cooperator's Loss it faces.109
2. Allocating Permits to Resolve the Cooperator's Loss
An initial allocation of permits among nations based in part on population
would favor most developing nations,"' thereby helping to resolve their
Cooperator's Loss. Allocation on the basis of population also fulfills Cline's
"one person, one emissions vote" principle"' in distributing rights to the
atmosphere, a global good." 2 Given that the environment and the atmosphere
are global goods to which each person in the world arguably has an equal
right, it is both logical and equitable that each person in the world should
receive an equal entitlement to these goods.
However, allocation based strictly on population would not resolve the
Cooperator's Loss for nations like the U.S., whose share of the world's GHG
emissions greatly exceeds its share of the world's population. u 3 In order to
resolve the Cooperator's Loss for both the U.S. and LDC's while promoting
an equitable distribution of permits, the allocation of permits should also be
based on expected national net benefits from GHG abatement. More permits
should be allocated to nations that expect fewer net benefits from abatement
107. For example, a green technology developed in an industrialized nation may be especially well-
suited to cutting emissions at inefficient LDC factories. The cost of purchasing the intellectual property
rights and equipment necessary to develop the technology might be $12 million, while the value on the
international market of the corresponding emissions permits freed up by the technology might be $20
million. The green technology might make it efficient for the LDC industry to engage in more industrial
activity, using some of its own "freed up" permits; but excess permits would probably still be available for
sale to industries in other nations.
108. The ITEP system could therefore help provide the mechanism for LDC's to "'leapfrog' directly
to more advanced and efficient technologies," which Grubb identified as a "fundamental issue" for a
successful GHG abatement regime. See GRUBB, supra note 36, at 24.
109. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 2104.
110. See EPSTEIN & GUPTA, supra note 22, at 14. Allocation based in part on population at a fixed
time-for example, 1990-would benefit developing nations in the initial allocation of permits while
encouraging efforts to control future population growth. See CLINF, supra note 8, at 354 n.24.
I 1. CLINE, supra note 8, at 353.
112. Sebenius, supra note 34, at 73.
113. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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so that some of the gain from abatement action is transferred back to these
nations to induce their participation in an international regime. Expected net
benefit may be calculated in part based on historical GHG emissions, as more
extensive abatement efforts will be necessary in nations with a historical
dependence upon GHG-emitting technologies." 4  But potential future
emissions are another important aspect of expected net benefits; nations that
forgo development of carbon-emitting fuel sources endure costs that are as real
as costs endured by nations that must stabilize or reduce their historically high
level of emissions." 5 These lost future benefits should also be factored into
the "net benefits from GHG abatement" calculation.
Although Cline advocates taxes over permits," 6 he proposes that
"if... taxes fail to achieve progress toward global emissions targets," permits
could be allocated on the basis of GDP and historical GHG use, along with
population." 7 He suggests that each of these three factors could be weighted
to establish both an equitable and politically acceptable international allocation
of permits." 8 This Note's conclusion that national expected net benefits
should be a primary basis for allocation suggests that Cline's formula should
be altered: GDP should not be included in the allocations equation, since GDP
bears no relation to expected net benefit from GHG abatement," 9 while
potential future emissions should be added to the equation.
In short, a weighted consideration of population, historical GHG emissions,
and potential future emissions would lead to an allocation of permits that
would be both equitable--distributing benefits of GHG abatement
worldwide-and practical-resolving the Cooperator's Loss and hence
facilitating international agreement. 20 Assuming all three factors are weighed
114. The inclusion of historical emissions in allocating permits would thus help resolve the
Cooperator's Loss position of the U.S.
115. For example, nations such as China may lose the potential benefits of their GHG-intensive energy
sources by participating in a GHG abatement regime.
116. See infra notes 143-153 and accompanying text (outlining and refuting Cline's reasoning for
preferring taxes over permits).
117. CLINE, supra note 8, at 352-53.
118. Id. at 353-54.
119. Indeed, on the basis of the above argument that rich nations might value the benefits of GHG
abatement more highly than poor nations, supra note 57, high GDP nations should receive fewer permits
than low GDP nations, not more permits as Cline's formula suggests. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 353-54.
It might be argued in response that greater allocation on the basis of GDP is equitable since it would
provide more permits where actual national productive output is higher. But permits allocated on this basis
would only serve to reinforce the status quo; rich nations would receive more permits on the basis of their
wealth, thereby entitling them to pollute more and become richer, while poor nations would receive few
permits, thereby stifling future economic growth.
120. Borrowing Cline's notation but modifying his equation in light of the above discussion, the final
allocations equation would be Qi = Qg [WhSb + WeSt + WPSP], where Q is the emissions quota, i is the
individual nation in question, g is the world as a whole, w represents the weight assigned to particular
variable, S represents nation i's share in the global total, and subscripts h, f, and p represent nation i's
historical use, future expected use, and population, respectively. Variables h and p should be measured at
a baseline time, so as to provide the proper incentives for population reduction and decrease in GHG use,
while variablefcan be adjusted over time in accordance with informational gains. See CLINE, supra note
8, at 353.
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equally, the U.S. would receive 14% of the world's permits,' and China
would receive 17%.122
B. Carbon Taxes Versus Carbon Permits: Economic Efficiency of Abatement
Policy Instruments
This Section argues that an ITEP regime is likely to be more economically
efficient than a tax system in the GHG abatement context. This argument is
not wholly separate from the discussion in the previous Section, but rather an
extension of it, for the economic efficiency of the tradeable emissions permit
scheme itself promotes international agreement. Nations are likely to find an
economically efficient scheme less costly and hence mbre attractive. Indeed,
the method of policy implementation may make the difference between a
regime in which the theoretical gains of abatement may actually be realized
and one in which the costs of abatement in fact exceed the benefits simply
because of an inherently inefficient policy instrument.'23
In theory, market-based tax and permit systems have exactly the same
effect: setting the tax at the marginal cost of emissions would lead to the
efficient quantity of emissions, while setting the quantity of emissions at the
efficient level would lead to a price increase equal to the efficient tax. 4 In
practice, however, when there are uncertainties about the ideally efficient levels
of control, the steepness (slope) of the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves may determine whether a tax or a permit system is preferable."z
As a general rule, given uncertainty about the placement of the marginal
cost curve, permits are more appropriate when the marginal benefit curve
(reflecting the marginal level of harm from emissions)'26 is steep, and the
marginal cost curve for controlling emissions is flat. 7 In contrast, taxes are
121. This figure is based on the U.S.' 4.8% share of the world's population, CLINE, supra note 8, at
330 tbl. 8.1, its 25% share of the world's emissions, GRUBB, supra note 36, at 15-16, and its expected 12%
share of world emissions in the year 2100, CLINE, supra note 8, at 337 tbl. 8.3.
122. This figure is based on China's 21.4% share of the world's population, CLINE, supra note 8, at
330 tbl. 8.1, its 12% share of the world's emissions, GRUBB, supra note 36, at 15, and its expected 18%
share of the world's emissions in the year 2100, CLINE, supra note 8, at 337 tbl. 8.3.
123. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 2069.
124. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 351; EPSTEIN & GUPTA, supra note 22, at 15; 'WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, STRATEGIES FOR THE CONTROL OF CARBON DIOXIDE 25 (Cowles Foundation for Research in
Economics at Yale University Discussion Paper No. 443, 1977); Stewart & Wiener, supra note 53, at 110.
125. As noted above, moreover, practical differences between the two systems affect the costs of
implementation. See supra text accompanying notes 102-109.
126. Note that the marginal level of harm from emissions is the same as the marginal benefit of
abating emissions.
127. In other words, if each additional unit of GHG emissions causes increasingly severe levels of
damage, the quantity-setting aspect of a permit system would help ensure that dangerous levels of harm
are avoided. Zvi Adar & James M. Griffin, Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollution Control Instrument,
3 J. ENVT'L ECON. & MGMT. 178, 184, 188 (1976); see EPSTEIN & GUPTA, supra note 22, at 15; Hahn &
Stavins, supra note 98, at 8-10; Stavins & Whitehead, supra note 98, at 34. See generally Martin L.
Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974) (pointing out comparative advantage
of quantity instruments over price instruments when either benefit function is more sharply curved or cost
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preferable when the marginal cost curve rises steeply while the marginal
benefit of abatement curve remains relatively flat. 2 Economists Cline and
Nordhaus have tried to make predictions about the steepness of marginal cost
and marginal benefit curves, but their predictions differ, as will be illustrated
below. Given the uncertainty that still prevails about placement of the marginal
cost curve, these economists' differing predictions about the steepness of the
marginal cost and benefit curves have important implications for choosing
between tax and permit systems.
1. Applying Cost-Benefit Curve Analysis to the Nordhaus Model
Applying the cost-benefit curve analysis outlined above to Nordhaus'
economic assessment of the costs and benefits of GHG abatement indicates
that an international GHG abatement regime should be either primarily or
exclusively a permit system. Figure 6-A is based on Nordhaus' sketch of the
marginal costs of GHG reductions and the marginal damage from GHG
emissions." 9 The slope of the marginal cost of abatement curve varies in
accordance with Nordhaus' conclusion that the first 10% of GHG emissions
can be reduced at low cost, while the marginal cost of abatement rises sharply
above that level. 30 The two damage curves reflect the wide range in
Nordhaus' own estimate about the level of damage to be expected from
greenhouse warming.' 3' Marginal Damage Curve I represents a low-level
estimate: the efficient level of reduction is below the 10% threshold, and hence
on the flatter part of the marginal cost curve. In a world of perfect predictive
ability, an efficient ITEP system would set the total level of GHG emissions
reduction at QE, while an efficient tax system would set the price of GHG
emissions at PE, where the actual marginal cost curve and the marginal damage
curve intersect (that is, where marginal cost equals marginal benefit).'
32
In the real world there is potential for error in estimating efficient
emissions or tax levels. The broken curve reflects the marginal cost of
abatement curve that policy analysts might hypothesize, given limited
function is more horizontal).
128. Thus, if the cost of abating greenhouse warming rises with increasing rapidity as more abatement
is undertaken, the price-setting characteristic of a tax system would ensure that extremely expensive levels
of abatement are avoided. CLINE, supra note 8, at 348; Adar & Griffin, supra note 127, at 188.
129. Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 924.
130. Id. at 936; see also Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 40-41 & fig. 1.
131. Id. at 933 (estimating that overall damage from a 3*C warming could be 1-2% of total global
income, but acknowledging the ad hoc nature of this estimate). I have also drawn the marginal damage
curves neither steep nor fiat, since Nordhaus says little is known about the shape of these curves. Id. at 923.
The slope I have given them is roughly the same as the slope Nordhaus gives his marginal damage curve,
which he draws as a "wavy line" to reflect uncertainty. ld. at 923-24.
132. In such a world, it would not matter whether policymakers chose a permit or a tax system,
because both would lead to the same efficient result.
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information and predictive capacities (i.e., uncertainty)., 33 As a result, they
would set the level of emissions reduction at Qp in an ITEP system, where
they believe the marginal cost and marginal damage curves intersect. Because
the level of emissions reduction would be set lower than the perfectly efficient
level, society's net loss due to uncertainty would be the area below the
marginal damage curve and above the actual marginal cost curve between QP
and QE. Hence, if the ITEP system is employed, the loss to society from
uncertainty would be the small lightly shaded region (A).
134
If a tax system is used with the same predicted marginal cost curve, the
policymakers would set the price of emissions at PT, again where they believe
marginal cost is equal to marginal benefit. The actual level of emissions
reduction, however, would be where the set price, PT, intersects the actual
marginal cost curve, at point X, leading to a level of emissions reduction at
point QT. The resulting loss of welfare to society due to uncertainty would be
the area between the marginal cost and marginal damage curves, the heavily
shaded region (B).
As the graph indicates, an ITEP system results in a lower net welfare loss
to society than a tax system when there are informational and predictive
limitations about actual marginal costs. 135 This conclusion is consistent with
the analysis in Section I(B), suggesting that a permit system is preferable
when marginal costs are relatively flat.
Indeed, this conclusion holds only for the portion of Nordhaus' marginal
cost curve below the 10% level of GHG reduction, where marginal costs rise
gradually. When the same analysis is carried out on Damage Curve II, which
intersects the marginal cost curve at its steeper portion, a tax system becomes
preferable. In that higher damage scenario, a tax system leads to a lower net
welfare loss to society (heavily shaded region D) than an ITEP system (lightly
shaded region Q. This conclusion is consistent with the analysis in Section
I(B) that a tax system is preferable when marginal costs are steep.
Thus, Nordhaus' GHG abatement cost and benefit functions suggest that
an international regime should allocate permits up to the 10% level of
abatement and impose a tax above that level. Based on Nordhaus' conclusion
that the most efficient level of abatement is 11%, an international regime
133. For the sake of clarity, the graph shows uncertainty going in only one direction, i.e., above the
actual marginal cost curve. In the real world, uncertainty could go in both directions-either above or
below the actual marginal cost curve-and the results would be symmetric on either side of the cost curve.
134. Even though there is a slight loss due to uncertainty about the placement of the marginal cost
curve, the graph still reflects a net benefit to society from abatement action. The net benefit is represented
by the area above the actual marginal cost curve and below the marginal damage curve up to point Qp.
135. Region B, representing the welfare loss to society from uncertainty under a tax system, is larger
than region A, representing the welfare loss to society from uncertainty under a permit system.
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should thus be primarily permit-based, with only a minimal tax.'36 Moreover,
since Nordhaus' marginal cost curve does not reflect the potential marginal
efficiencies of international action,137 the flat part of the marginal cost curve
probably extends beyond the 10% level of abatement, making an ITEP system
preferable over an even wider range of investment levels. If one takes account
of these additional marginal efficiencies not considered by Nordhaus, an ITEP
system alone would be likely to achieve an efficient level of GHG reduction.
2. Applying Cost-Benefit Curve Analysis to the Cline Model
Based on the shape of Cline's cost and benefit curves, an ITEP system
would be preferable to a tax system. In contrast to Nordhaus, who expresses
uncertainty about the shape of the marginal damage function, Cline asserts that
greenhouse warming damage functions have exponents ranging from 1.3 to
2.0.138 Any damage exponent higher than 1.0 implies that marginal damages
increase as emissions increase; hence the marginal damage curve increases
with increasing levels of emissions. 39 Moreover, Cline's GHG abatement
cost functions are essentially linear, and have "gentler slopes" in the long term
on the assumption that technological improvements will make abatement
efforts less costly. 40 Furthermore, Cline estimates that the first 20% of GHG
emissions reduction could take place at very low cost, in contrast to Nordhaus'
10% estimate.41  Figure 6-B is based on Cline's description of the damage
and cost functions in the long term.
142
Again, assuming that policymakers lack perfect information and their
predicted marginal cost curve differs from the actual marginal cost curve, they
will set total emissions reduction at Q, (rather than QE, the truly efficient level)
136. Nonetheless, Nordhaus argues that a carbon tax would be preferable because it would generate
revenue for the government and the public, rather than just transferring revenue between industries, which
he calls the "scam" of the CFC tradeable emissions program. Interview with William D. Nordhaus,
Professor of Economics, Yale University, in New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 23, 1992). Under the CFC tradeable
emissions program, the government distributed a limited number of permits to industry at no charge. Such
gratuitous distribution of permits, however, is not an inherent feature of a permit system. Tradeable permits
auctioned to industry would generate revenue for the government. See Stavins & Whitehead, supra note
98, at 34. An auction would ensure that the price of permits is set at an efficient market rate. Indeed, if
permits are leased by the government at auctioned rates, they could provide as stable and regular a source
of revenue as taxes. The advantages of an auction-lease system over a simple auction system are discussed
infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32 (pointing out that Nordhaus' cost data is based only
on the U.S.).
138. CLINE, supra note 8, at 292.
139. Id. Cline points out, for example, that coastal flooding and land loss from the melting of glaciers
and ice sheets would occur with increasing severity at higher levels of global warming. Id. at 107-10,
especially 109-110. Because Cline analyzes a longer period than Nordhaus and uses a relatively low
discount rate, the potential impact of his geometric damage curve is heightened.
140. Id. at 198-99 & fig. 5.1, 228, 232.
141. Id. at 228, 232.
142. The sketch as such does not appear in Cline, but is based on his descriptions of the cost and
damage functions. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
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in an ITEP system. The resulting welfare loss would be the lightly shaded
region (E), between the marginal damage and actual marginal cost curves. In
contrast, if policymakers implement a tax system on the basis of their predicted
marginal cost curve, they will set a tax on emissions at PT, with a resulting
level of emissions reduction at QT (where the set price intersects the actual
marginal cost curve). The welfare loss under such a tax system is represented
by the heavily shaded region (F), the area between the actual marginal cost
curve and the marginal damage curve. Consistent with the analysis in Section
mI(B), an ITEP system is more efficient than a tax system in the Cline model
since marginal costs increase gradually while marginal damages increase
sharply with increasing levels of GHG warming.
While Cline notes in passing that an analysis of the steepness of cost and
benefit curves might lead to preference for a "quota" (permit) system over a
tax system in the global warming context,'43 he nonetheless recommends
taxes for several reasons. First, Cline argues that one can easily readjust taxes
if they lead to inefficient levels of emissions.' 44 However, this point begs the
question; the only way policymakers can know whether the level of emissions
under a tax system is inefficient is if there is no uncertainty about the marginal
cost and marginal damage curves. In such a world of perfect information, both
a tax system and an ITEP system would lead to the perfectly efficient
outcome, and there would be no preference for one over the other.145 The
relevant inquiry, then, is which system is preferable given the uncertainties that
policymakers face.
t 46
Second, Cline asserts that because permits would require an initial
allocation determination that would be extremely difficult to negotiate, a tax
would be preferable in the short term. Taxes, he argues, "would be blind with
respect to individual countries and parties."'47 Yet his analysis on this point
is also flawed. While it is true that negotiating the initial allocation of permits
would be difficult, an international unit tax for emissions is infeasible.
Industries in developing countries have less advanced technologies for reducing
143. CLINE, supra note 8, at 350.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
146. Moreover, if policymakers gain additional information, the level of permits could be readjusted
under a permit system almost as easily as a tax is readjusted: the government could buy back permits from
industry when the costs of controlling emissions fall, or could decide not to re-lease some permits after a
lease period expires. If the government auctioned the permits to industry in the first place in order to raise
revenue rather than distributing them at no cost, it should not be burdensome for the government to buy
some permits back from industry. See Stavins & Whitehead, supra note 98, at 34 (pointing out that permits
could be auctioned by government to raise revenue). Indeed, government acting in the public interest would
generally want to purchase permits back from industry just after the price of permits has fallen in response
to some development, such as a technological advance, that lowers the costs of controlling emissions, and
hence lowers the efficient level of emissions. The burden on government coffers, therefore, should not be
severe, since the government will generally have sold the permits at a higher price than it must pay to
repurchase them.
147. CLINE, supra note 8, at 351.
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GHG emissions, 48 which would make the tax most burdensome per unit of
industrial output in nations that could least afford it. Even disregarding the
differences in technology, a tax which an industry in a developed nation could
easily bear would be devastating to an industry in a developing nation.' 49 A
budding industry in China or India, for example, simply could not afford to
pay a per unit tax that equalled a per unit tax set in the U.S.'5
Cline is correct that countries could not negotiate an international
allocation of permits in the short term. But it makes sense to begin working
toward negotiating an ITEP system, since an international tax would be no
easier to negotiate, while the ITEP system is better suited to the economics of
global warming. 5' The first step toward such an international regime could
be implementing tradeable emissions permit systems on the domestic level.
52
Nations that have already committed themselves to GHG reduction or
stabilization 53 would benefit from such a system's efficiencies while they
promote the planning and negotiation of an even more efficient international
tradeable emissions permit regime. Domestic implementation of tradeable
emissions permit systems would also provide a model to the rest of the world
for efficient GHG reduction, thereby facilitating negotiation of an international
system.
C. Applying the Permit System to the Cooperator's Loss Game
The previous two Sections demonstrated that an ITEP system would
provide an equitable and efficient basis for resolving the Cooperator's Loss.
An initial, front-end distribution of permits, however, would modify the choice
matrix presented in Figure 4. Using the figures set out in Part II, and assuming
a transfer of $2 B to the developing world through skewed distribution of
permits, Figure 7 illustrates the situation immediately after the permit
allocation. Because the distribution of permits occurs on the front end, the
Third World receives $2 B in permits regardless of whether it cooperates in
the GHG abatement scheme.
148. See GRUBB, supra note 36, at 24.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
150. One might argue, in response, that different tax rates should be set in different nations to account
for economic disparities. However, there are two problems with that option: first, the global efficiencies
of achieving the greatest abatement at the lowest marginal cost would be lost, supra note 103; second, the
obstacles to negotiating such variable tax rates on an international scale could be at least as great as the
obstacles to negotiating an international allocation of permits.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 129-142.
152. During the campaign, Bill Clinton advocated such a domestic tradeable emissions permit system
as one way to deal with the global warming problem. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. He
promoted a carbon tax with equal enthusiasm, however, apparently unaware that a permit system would
be more efficient than a tax system. Berg, supra note 87, at 38.
153. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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In Figure 7, both the northwest and the northeast quadrants, in which the First
World cooperates, reflect the transfer of $2 B from the developed world to the
developing world, whereas Figure 4 hypothesized that a transfer would be
made only if the Third World cooperates. Since the ITEP system must allocate
permits on the front end, there is no way to restrict the transfer to the total
cooperation scenario- 54
Nonetheless, the problem presented after the allocation of permits is still
a traditional Prisoner's Dilemma, and the only difference between Figures 7
and 4 is that an international agreement must threaten a tariff of $8 B for
Third-World noncooperation in Figure 7 (the ITEP system), whereas it need
only threaten a tariff of $6 B for Third-World noncooperation in Figure 455
The final post-tariff result is precisely the same as in Figure 5 above.
Hence, an ITEP system with allocation of permits adjusted to induce
cooperation and with penalty tariffs imposed against noncooperators would
provide the most efficient and equitable regime for GHG abatement. Moreover,
a leased ITEP system (with lease price determined by auction to maximize
market efficiencies) would provide governments with a regular source of
revenue, which they could use to offset reduction of inefficient taxes or for
environmental cleanup. 56 While the simple sale of permits would provide
government revenue, governments might prefer leasing if they suspect that the
price of permits will be highly volatile and they want to take advantage of
possible future increases in their value. Leasing would also prevent one
government or one industry in a nation from permanently selling its nation's
154. Since the First World is not cooperating in the southwest and southeast quadrants, no transfer is
made in those scenarios.
155. Note that the "tariff' here has no relation to the discussion about taxes versus permits above. The
tariffs imposed for noncooperation are penalties, and could take the form of trade sanctions on nations that
refuse to participate in a GHG abatement regime. Such tariffs are actually unlikely to be imposed because
the mere threat of their imposition should be sufficient to induce cooperation. The "taxes" discussed in Part
III, in contrast, are not penalties but fees designed to make industries internalize the costs of their polluting
activities. Part HI concluded that permits would achieve this goal more efficiently than taxes in the global
warming context.
156. Cf. Stavins & Whitehead, supra note 98, at 15-16 (suggesting such uses for a domestic carbon
tax).
1st i 3rd 1st I 3rd
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future rights to other nations, and would thus help prevent the problem of one
government declaring invalid the actions of a predecessor government in the
same nation. 57 Finally, leasing permits might be preferable to selling them
because leasing reduces the potential for a nation, a group of nations, or an
industry coalition to buy up a large share of the permits and attain global
oligopoly power or form a cartel.'58
CONCLUSION
Despite scientific uncertainty and conflicting assumptions in economic
models of GHG abatement, moderate to aggressive abatement measures are
warranted to avert the potentially irreversible, catastrophic impact of global
warming. The most effective and efficient abatement measures require
worldwide cooperation both to overcome free riding and to exploit the
marginal efficiencies involved in abating GHG's where doing so is cheapest.
Even assuming that GHG abatement action is efficient and assuming
international cooperation, certain nations may have more to lose under a GHG
abatement regime than they would lose from unabated global warming.
Developing nations and the U.S. probably believe they face such a
Cooperator's Loss. Developing nations fear that losses from forgone
industrialization would exceed the potential benefits they would receive from
GHG abatement, while the U.S. fears it would be burdened with a huge share
of the GHG abatement costs because of its dependence upon GHG-emitting
technologies.
An ITEP regime could help resolve the Cooperator's Loss in three ways.
First, it would promote abatement at the lowest possible cost by allowing
nations to take advantage of marginal efficiencies on an international scale.
Second, an ITEP system would prove more administrable and equitable than
a tax system in resolving the Cooperator's Loss. In developing nations, taxes
could be devastating. In contrast, permits distributed in part based on
population might resolve the international negotiation deadlock by giving
industries in developed nations the opportunity to obtain permits through
purchase or trade, while providing developing nations with green technology
and revenue. Finally, the ITEP system would minimize the welfare loss from
uncertainty about the level of marginal costs. By equitably allocating emissions
permits and facilitating the efficient reallocation of permits on an international
market, the ITEP system could resolve the Cooperator's Loss and thereby avert
the impending global warming crisis.
157. See GRUBB, supra note 36, at 34.
158. See CLINE, supra note 8, at 352.
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